Indigenous Rights and Multinational Corporations at International Law by Macklem, Patrick
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 24
Number 3 Spring 2001 Article 13
1-1-2001
Indigenous Rights and Multinational Corporations
at International Law
Patrick Macklem
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Rights and Multinational Corporations at International Law, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 475
(2001).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol24/iss3/13
Indigenous Rights and Multinational
Corporations at International Law
BY PATRICK MACKLEM*
Indigenous peoples confronting multinational corporate activity
that adversely affects their interests occupy an ambiguous position in
international law. Much of international law governs relations among
sovereign states by and through a distribution of sovereignty
constructed on an exclusion of indigenous peoples from the
community of nations. In recent years, international human rights law
has begun to recognize the legal significance of indigenous cultures,
territorial commitments, and forms of governance in ways that begin
to enable legal scrutiny of multinational corporate activity. But
international legal recognition to date has been partial and
ambivalent, in part because indigenous rights pose unique challenges
to traditional understandings of the international legal order.
In my remarks today, I want to focus on two ongoing legal
disputes involving indigenous peoples and multinational corporate
activity that dramatically reveal these challenges. The first involves
the Awas Tingni, an indigenous community residing on lands located
on the northern Caribbean coast of Nicaragua. The lands include
valuable rain forest that Nicaragua authorized Sol del Caribe, S.A.
(Solcarsa) to harvest for timber. In 1995, the Awas Tingni presented a
petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
alleging that by awarding a timber concession to Solcarsa, Nicaragua
had violated Article 21 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (American Convention), which guarantees that "[e]veryone
has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property."' The matter is
* Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
1. Petition by the Mayagna Indian Community of Awas Tingni and Jaime
Castillo Felipe, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Community of Awas Tingni,
Against Nicaragua, reprinted in S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingni Petition to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and
Government Neglect in Nicaragua, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 157, 164-201 (1996);
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currently before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The second involves the Kitkatla First Nation, an indigenous
community residing in northern British Columbia. The Kitkatla are
challenging the constitutionality of a license and several permits
granted by British Columbia to International Forest Products Ltd.
(Interfor).2 The permits authorize Interfor to log lands that possess
profound spiritual significance to the Kitkatla. The Kitkatla have
alleged that by authorizing the logging, British Columbia has invaded
the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada. They
are arguing that Parliament alone possesses the authority to enact
laws in relation to indigenous heritage in light of section 35 of the
Constitution of Canada, which recognizes and affirms the "existing
aboriginal... rights of the aboriginal people of Canada." The matter
is currently before the Supreme Court of Canada.
Although one rests on international law and the other on
constitutional law, the two cases possess remarkable similarities. Both
involve an indigenous community seeking to prevent a multinational
corporation from engaging in resource extraction on ancient
indigenous territory. Both draw attention to the role of the state in
authorizing multinational corporate activity within its jurisdiction.
And both involve an appeal to law as a means of mediating
competing entitlements to lands and resources.
Beyond the fact that they both seek to legally interrogate a
triangular relationship in which the state has authorized a
multinational corporation to log lands occupied by an indigenous
community, the two cases possess additional features in common.
First, both cases implicate emergent jurisprudence on consultation
requirements on states and corporations seeking to engage in activity
that threatens the exercise of indigenous rights. In Awas Tingni, the
Inter-American Court is considering whether Article 21(2) of the
American Convention, which provides that "[n]o one shall be
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation,
for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and
according to the forms established by law," requires a state to consult
with an indigenous community prior to engaging in or authorizing
action that interferes with the enjoyment of indigenous title.
American Convention on Human Rights ("Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica"), Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. For an update on the Awas Tingni case, see
http://www.indianlaw.org/awasjtingni.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2001).
2. Kitkatla v. British Columbia (Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2000]
B.C.J. No. 86 (B.C.C.A.).
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In Kitkatla, it is not contested that British Columbia is under a
duty to consult prior to authorizing activity that interferes with the
exercise of indigenous rights. Canadian law obligates the state to
consult with an indigenous community before undertaking action that
might interfere with indigenous rights recognized by the
Constitution.' But the nature and scope of this duty remains relatively
undefined, and earlier proceedings associated with the case raise
important questions about when this duty is triggered, whether it
extends to third parties, and what it requires of the parties to a
dispute.4
Both cases therefore represent efforts to reconstitute the law -
international law in the case of Awas Tingni, domestic law in the case
of Kitkatla - in ways that create incentives ex ante to promote
negotiation over litigation. Indigenous claims often involve oral
histories, intercultural disagreement, and a complex set of competing
interests that the judiciary lacks the institutional competence to
resolve in a manner acceptable to all parties. Negotiation processes
enable parties to participate directly in proposed solutions and
produce compromises that litigation might otherwise foreclose.
Negotiation also possesses the capacity to produce acceptable
outcomes before state or third party action results in a violation of
indigenous rights. By arguing that the state and, by extension,
multinational corporations are subject to ex ante negotiation and
consultation requirements, both the Awas Tingni and the Kitkatla are
seeking a legal framework that protects their rights in ways that
minimize the possibility of ex post violations.
Second, the triangular relationship of the actors involved in each
case reveals the fragility of efforts to establish a bright line between
public and private action in the context of multinational corporate
activity that threatens indigenous interests. Both cases go through the
state to attempt to hold multinational corporations to the rule of law.
Both demonstrate the realist insight that corporate authority is
delegated state authority, manifest in the concession granted by
Nicaragua to Solcarsa and the licenses granted by British Columbia to
Interfor. Both illustrate the fact that states actively participate in
3. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1113.
4. Sonia Lawrence & Patrick Macklem, From Consultation to Reconciliation:
Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty to Consult, 79 CAN. BAR REV. 252 (2000).
5. For a classic articulation of this view, see Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (arguing
that private authority is constituted by public distribution of property rights).
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constructing the elusive legal character of multinational corporate
authority.
Finally, both manifest a blurring of the divide between the
domestic and the international. In Awas Tingni, the Assembly of First
Nations (AFN), the national representative organization of over 600
First Nations in Canada, filed an amicus curae brief drawing the
Inter-American Court's attention to domestic constitutional
jurisprudence on indigenous title.6 Specifically, the AFN has argued
that domestic constitutional jurisprudence in Canada should be an
indicator of general principles of international law that ought to
inform the Court's interpretation of the American Convention. It has
argued that the fact that indigenous title is protected as of
constitutional right in Canada supports the proposition that
indigenous title constitutes a property right as affirmed by Article
21 (1) of the American Convention.
In Kitkatla, the Kitkatla have argued that international legal
developments concerning the rights of indigenous peoples are
relevant in interpreting domestic constitutional obligations. They
have relied on a report by the Special Rapporteur to the United
Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities. The report advocates legal protection of the
heritage of indigenous peoples, namely, "all objects, sites and
knowledge, the nature or use of which has been transmitted from
generation to generation, and which is regarded as pertaining to a
particular peoples, clan or territory."' They have also relied on a
report by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which calls for formal processes of "identifying the actual
locations and boundaries of indigenous lands or territories and
physically marking those boundaries on the ground."9
Despite these similarities, there is a key difference between the
6. Patrick Macklem & Ed Morgan, Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American
System: The Amicus Brief of the Assembly of First Nations in Awas Tingni v.
Republic of Nicaragua, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 569 (2000).
7. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. at 1095.
8. Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Preliminary Report of the
Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., Annex 9I
11, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1994/31 (1994).
9. Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land: Final Working Paper
Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52d Sess. 49,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/25 (2000).
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two cases, and it is not simply that one is grounded in international
law and the other in domestic law. Awas Tingni implicates what might
be termed an undifferentiated right - the right to property - that
attaches to all persons governed by the American Convention, and
the Awas Tingni are seeking to partake of that more general
attachment. Although they argue that the right to property ought to
protect indigenous forms of land tenure, they are seeking refuge in a
right that attaches to all. Kitkatla implicates what might be termed
differentiated rights - rights that differentiate among persons. " The
Kitkatla are asserting rights that recognize differences, partly denied
and partly produced by the international distribution of territorial
sovereignty initiated by colonization, that exist between indigenous
and non-indigenous peoples.11 In other words, the Kitkatla are
asserting rights that differentiate indigenous people from non-
indigenous people and directly implicate the moral significance of
history.
The distinction between differentiated and undifferentiated
rights is not one that maps directly on the distinction between the
domestic and the international. A number of constitutional
democracies entrench rights that attach to all citizens of a particular
polity as well as rights that attach to particular classes of citizens, such
as ethnic or cultural minorities, and, in the case of Canada and
Nicaragua, indigenous peoples. International human rights law also
commits itself to both differentiated and undifferentiated rights. The
International Labour Organization (ILO) has long advocated the
protection of differentiated indigenous rights at international law.
ILO Convention 169, for example, enshrines the right of indigenous
peoples to "participate in the formulation, implementation and
evaluation of plans and programmes for national and international
development which may affect them directly."'2 More recently, the
United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples aspires to enshrine international rights that attach to
indigenous peoples on account of their indigenous difference. Article
10. See generally WILL KYMLiCKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 6-7 (1995) (introducing concept of "group-
differentiated rights").
11. See generally PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (2001).
12. ILO Convention No. 169, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter ILO
Convention].
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30 of the Draft Declaration, for example, declares that indigenous
peoples have "the right to require that States obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their
lands, territories and other resources.
13
In contrast, various articles of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 4 as well as the American
Convention, enshrine rights that attach to all persons. Indigenous
peoples have asserted several of these rights - specifically, the right to
self-determination, culture, privacy, and family life, in a variety of
cases to protect cultural, economic, territorial and political interests
threatened by assimilative forces of the broader societies in which
they are located. 5 The Human Rights Committee has expressed the
view that Article 27 of the ICCPR, which guarantees a right to belong
13. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., 36th mtg., Annex at 112,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994). See also Proposed American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 1333d Sess., OEA/Ser/L/V/II.95
(1997) (proposing to enshrine indigenous cultural, land, territorial and resource rights
and indigenous rights of autonomy, self-government, and political participation)
(approved by Inter-Am. C.H.R. on Feb. 26, 1997), reprinted in ORG. OF AM. STATES,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, at
633-45 (1997), available at http:llwww.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/96eng/96encont.htm
(March 14, 1997).
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
15. See R.L. v. Canada, Communication No. 358/1989, Report of the Human
Rights Commission, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Commission, 47th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 366, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992) (concluding that Article 1 right to self-
determination cannot be adjudicated under the Optional Protocol, which is available
only for individual, not collective, rights). But see General Comment No. 12(21),
regarding Article 1 of the ICCPR, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (1984) (stating the
right to self-determination is "an essential condition for the effective guarantee and
observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of
those rights"); Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, Report of the Human
Rights Commission, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Commission, 43d Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 229, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (suggesting Article 27 right to culture protects
economic activity that is an "essential element in the culture" of an indigenous
community); Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication
No. 167/1984, Report of the Human Rights Commission, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights
Commission, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II T 32.2, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 "(1990)
(stating Article 27 right to culture protects the right of indigenous persons, "in
community with others, to engage in economic and social activities which are part of
the culture of the community to which they belong"); Hopu & Bessert v. France,
Communication No. 549/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC601D/549/1993lRev.1 (1997)
(stating Articles 23 and 17 rights to privacy and a family life protect indigenous
heritage lands).
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to one's culture, contemplates the protection of a "way of life which is
closely connected with territory and use of its resources," and the
protection of economic and social activities that are essential
elements of the culture of an indigenous community."
Part of the appeal of undifferentiated rights, such as the right to
belong to one's culture,17 lies in their relation to universal conceptions
of human rights, a cornerstone of contemporary international human
rights law. Such rights attach to indigenous peoples not on account of
their indigenous difference but instead because they relate to aspects
of identity that are seen as constituting fundamental attributes of all
human beings regardless of individual, social or historical differences.
The fact that a community is indigenous may be relevant to the
content, but not the availability, of these rights. Thus the right to
belong to one's culture may entail a unique set of protections given an
indigenous community's location in and relationship with the broader
society, but the right itself is one that attaches to all persons
regardless of their cultural backgrounds.
Part of the appeal of differentiated rights of indigenous peoples
lies in the intuition that there is something about indigenous
difference that merits legal protection. Attempts at defining what
constitutes an indigenous people typically list factors that implicitly
attempt to articulate this intuition. ILO Convention 169, for example,
defines indigenous peoples in terms of "their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, or geographical region to
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or
the establishment of present State boundaries.""8 But the implicit
16. General Comment No. 23(50), regarding Article 27 of the ICCPR, Report of
the Human Rights Commission, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Commission, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, vol. I, Annex V 3.2, U.N. Doc. A/49140 (1994).
17. It might be that Article 27 enshrines a differentiated right because it provides
that persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities shall not be
denied the right to enjoy their own culture, and thus conditions the right to cultural
protection on minority status. For a clearer case in which an indigenous community
has sought and received protection by way of an undifferentiated right enshrined in
the ICCPR, see Hopu & Bessert v. France, Communication No. 549/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPRC/601D/549/1993/Rev.1 (1997) (stating Articles 23 and 17 rights to privacy and
a family life protect indigenous heritage lands).
18. ILO Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(1)(b). See also Jos6 R. Martfnez Cobo,
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N.
ESCOR, 13th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item 4 379, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1987) ("Indigenous communities, peoples and nations
are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.").
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needs to be made explicit. Differentiated rights of indigenous peoples
represent legal commitments to address adverse distributional
consequences produced by assertions of territorial sovereignty over
indigenous peoples and indigenous territory. Whether by
international or domestic law, they impose constraints on the exercise
of territorial sovereignty acquired in the absence of indigenous
consent and thereby lend a measure of legitimacy to sovereign
authority acquired through morally suspect colonization projects.
It is perhaps for this reason that indigenous peoples occupy an
ambiguous position at international law. Indigenous rights expose the
suspect origins and ongoing adverse consequences of the
international distribution of sovereignty. In the context of state-
sanctioned multinational corporate activity that threatens indigenous
interests, international law thus confronts the following difficult
question. Why do indigenous interests yield rights at international law
that do not attach to a non-indigenous community facing a similar set
of harms? Why does an indigenous people, in other words, possess
legal personality at international law that authorizes international
scrutiny of state-sanctioned multinational corporate activity?
International indigenous legal personality in such circumstances is a
far cry from the traditional understanding of international law - one
that regards international law as producing and maintaining the
distribution of sovereignty among states and seeking to prevent the
exercise of sovereignty in ways that infringe universal human rights.
Given that international law was founded in part on the denial of
indigenous legal personality, this question is especially challenging to
the international legal imagination.
The flip side of this question is the international legal status of
the multinational corporation. Corporations historically have not
been subject to international legal obligations to respect human
rights, including indigenous rights, except through and by the force of
domestic law.'9 But, as several participants in this Conference have
noted, international law is also beginning to acknowledge that
multinational corporations possess international legal obligations in a
19. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999). At its second
meeting, on Aug. 1, 2000, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights decided to
establish a sessional working group to examine the working methods and activities of
transnational corporations. U.S. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/Dec/2000/101 (2000).
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number of circumstances.20 At the very least, the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
make indirect reference to private actors, stipulating that they do not
authorize "any State, group or person" to engage in activity that
would infringe international human rights.2' And Awas Tingni and
Kitkatla demonstrate the extent to which the state is deeply
implicated in multinational corporate activity that threatens
indigenous interests.
If indigenous peoples possess international legal rights and
multinational corporations possess international legal duties,
including a duty to consult with an indigenous community prior to
engaging in action that threatens the community's interests, then
international law is not simply a body of law that balances the
imperatives of state sovereignty and universal human rights. It
becomes a project that blurs litigation and negotiation, the domestic
and international, the public and the private, and the universal and
particular; that imposes on non-state actors intergenerational rights
and responsibilities that protect interests rooted in history; and that
obligates states to acknowledge that the legitimacy of the authority
they delegate to multinational corporations rests on their capacity to
20. See generally THE LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000). It is
also beginning to vest corporations with the capacity to sue states in certain
circumstances. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 11, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 283,32 I.L.M. 605.
21. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 5, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Nothing in the present Covenant may
be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms
recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
present Covenant.") [hereinafter ICESCR]. The ICCPR has similar language.
ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 5. The preambles of both Covenants also state that "the
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant." ICCPR, supra note 14, preamble;
ICESCR, supra, preamble. Article 45 of the Draft United Nations Declaration
provides that "[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations." Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 13, at 115. See also Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 30 (1948)
("Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."); id., art. 29(1)
("Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.").
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come to grips with sovereignty's suspect origins. It becomes, in other
words, an exciting, postcolonial project with a curious, conservative
twist - one that reconfigures the present to enable the future to
respect the past.
